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Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern eco-
nomic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contribu-
tions to this area.
The first essay constructs a matching mechanism in an incomplete information
matching market in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and
unique stable match. The mechanism asks each agent in the matching market to
reveal her privately known type. Through its novel payment rule, truthful revelation
forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in this setting. This mechanism works in one-,
two- and many-sided matching markets, thus offering the first mechanism to unify
these matching markets under a single mechanism design framework.
The second essay confronts a problem of matching in an environment in which
no efficient and incentive compatible matching mechanism exists due to matching
externalities. I develop a two-stage matching game in which a contracting stage fa-
cilitates subsequent conditionally efficient and incentive compatible Vickrey auction
stage. Infinite repetition of this two-stage matching game enforces the contract in
every period. This mechanism produces inequitably distributed social improvement:
parties to the contract receive all of the gains and then some.
The final essay demonstrates the existence of prices which stably and effi-
ciently partition a single set of agents into firms and workers, and match those two
sets to each other. This pricing system extends Kelso and Crawford’s [14] general
equilibrium results in a labor market matching model and links one- and two-sided
matching markets as well.
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My dissertation consists of three essays on matching. Gale and Shapley’s
seminal paper [6] introduced matching theory to economics, spawning several ma-
jor sub-literatures. The first, to which Gale and Shapley’s paper belongs, studies
matching algorithms. It assumes complete information about each agent’s prefer-
ence relation over other agents; thus the agents do not and cannot strategic behavior
during the execution of the algorithm. The second is the closely related study of
matching mechanisms. It assumes various types of incomplete information and al-
lows strategic misreporting by one or more agents. Work in this area designs a
procedure (usually an algorithm or auction-like mechanism) that mitigates agents’
incentives to strategically misreport their information. The third is the study of
matching in the tradition of general equilibrium. Traditional tools of general equi-
librium only apply when the market for each good is reasonably thick. In a matching
environment, each person who seeks a match is a unique and indivisible good. This
literature develops particular tools which expand ideas of general equilibrium to
these matching environments in which traditional tools are insufficient.
The first and second essays of this dissertation contribute to the second sub-
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literature. The first essay introduces an auction-like mechanism that implements
the positive assortative match in a wide variety of incomplete information match-
ing environments in which the positive assortative match in the unique efficient
stable match. The second essay develops a second-best hybrid contracts and auc-
tion mechanism in a repeated college admissions environment that does not admit
a fully efficient and incentive compatible mechanism. The last essay contributes
to the third sub-literature: it extends ideas of general equilibrium from Kelso and
Crawford [14] to a labor market in which the partition between firms and workers
is endogenously determined.
The first essay provides a unifying framework for matching markets with in-
complete information, when the positive assortative match is the unique efficient
stable match. I construct a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-like mechanism which imple-
ments assortative matching as an ex post Nash equilibrium. It achieves this result
using a payment rule that distinguishes between an agent deprived of any match
and an agent who merely receives a reduced match surplus. The constructed mech-
anism recognizes only opportunity costs arising from the former, and not the latter,
effect. I also generalize the stronger condition of envy freeness to these incomplete
information environments and show that the constructed equilibrium is envy free.
The second essay introduces a dynamic matching mechanism in which a per-
sistent contracting relationship - an “old boys’ club” - occurs in a distribution-
independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium when the high school in the club is suf-
ficiently patient. Matching occurs in two stages: first, contracting between the
college and a high school; second, running a Vickrey auction in the simplified post-
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contracting admissions market. The mechanism provides the second best total sur-
plus among several mechanisms in a repeated college admissions market in which
externalities preclude solutions using standard mechanism and market design tech-
niques. An “old boys’ club” emerges between one college and a sufficiently patient
single high school as a consequence of contract enforcement rather than ex ante
bias on the part of the college. Members of the club benefit at the expense of the
non-contracted high school.
The third essay considers a modified version of Kelso and Crawford’s model of
labor market matching with transferrable utility in which the partition between firms
and workers is endogenously determined rather than an assumption of the model. I
show that there exist prices in this market which stable support the socially optimal
partition of agents into firms and workers, and the consequent socially optimal match
of those firms and workers.
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Chapter 2: Implementation of Assortative Matching Under Incom-
plete Information
2.1 Introduction
Matching markets in which people have incomplete information about the
qualities of potential partner(s) occur frequently and there are a variety of practical
approaches that (try to) elicit this information prior to match formation to facili-
tate more productive or more stable matches. The interview process facilitates job
matching; the dating process facilitates marriage. This paper considers matching
markets in which all matches are formed through a single central clearinghouse,
and in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and unique sta-
ble match. I model this clearinghouse as a direct revelation mechanism to which
each agent reports her privately known partner quality; the mechanism implements
the positive assortative match given the agents’ reports. Truthful reporting in this
mechanism forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in all such incomplete information
matching environments (roommate, marriage, supply chain, both one-to-one and
many-to-one versions).
The main contribution of this mechanism is its payment rule. It distinguishes
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between the opportunity cost an agent imposes on other agents whom her report
deprives of membership in a match, and the opportunity cost she imposes when her
report merely alters the value of other agents’ respective match surpluses. When
each agent’s payment contains the former but not the latter opportunity costs,
truthful reporting forms an ex post Nash equilibrium. The simplest example is a
roommate market with three agents and a single two-person room. Each person re-
ports her privately known roommate quality to the mechanism. The people with the
two higher reported qualities each receive one bed and each of these two roommates
receives a match surplus that is increasing and supermodular in her own and her
roommate’s qualities. The person who reports the lowest quality receives neither
bed, deprives no one else of a bed, and pays zero. Each winning roommate has two
effects: first, she deprives the person who submits the lowest report of a bed; second,
she affects her roommate’s match surplus. Her payment is the opportunity cost she
imposes on the person who did not receive a bed, but does not include her effect on
her roommate. This payment rule is the correct generalization of the payment rule
in the VCG mechanism (with independent private values) to the interdependent
value environment of these matching markets. Under independent private values,
a person imposes opportunity costs on others only when her report deprives others
of objects. The payment rule of the VCG-like matching mechanism of this paper
recognizes that the only opportunity costs that should contribute to an agent’s pay-
ment are those that arise due to depriving other agents of objects, even when other
externalities are present due to interdependence.
Another way to view the VCG-like mechanism is as a position auction which
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implements positive assortative matching in this paper’s class of matching markets.
Matching theory and auction theory began contemporaneously but independently.
Vickrey’s seminal auction paper [21] describes a generalization of the second price
auction to multiple identical objects and shows that there is no mechanism that
elicits both true supply curves and demand curves. His work lays out the primary
concerns addressed in subsequent auction papers: elicitation of buyers’ private val-
uations, efficiency, and revenue. On the other hand, algorithmic design and match
stability are the primary concerns in the (early) matching literature. Gale and Shap-
ley’s seminal matching paper [6] introduces their deferred acceptance algorithm.
They show that it always finds a stable match in a marriage market in which pref-
erences are public information, and that a stable match always exists in a marriage
market.
Kelso and Crawford [14] were the first authors to link the matching and auc-
tion theory literatures. They exhibit a discrete wage adjustment algorithm similar
to a clock auction that identifies and implements a stable match between firms and
workers in a complete information setting. The intersection of these fields has since
emerged as a fruitful area with numerous interesting problems and results. How-
ever, Roth [18] demonstrates that when matching theory considers the problem of
preference elicitation (akin to the auction-theoretic concern of eliciting valuations)
truthful revelation of preferences can be a dominant strategy for only one side of a
marriage market in an efficient matching mechanism. The impossibility arises due
to preference heterogeneity across agents.
Current work on matching with incomplete information assumes homogeneous,
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known preferences and that each agent privately observes her single-dimensional
quality as a partner. These markets assume that agents’ payoff functions are such
that each agent strictly prefers a higher quality to a lower quality partner. It is well
known that in the full information analog of this environment, positive assortative
matching is both the unique efficient and unique stable match. Having eliminated
preference heterogeneity, there are several interesting results concerning mechanisms
which implement positive assortative matching in marriage markets. The two main
papers considering these models are by Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela [11] and John-
son [13]. Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela [11] show that a fully separating signaling
equilibrium exists in a marriage market with privately informed agents, but that
random matching may be socially superior to a signaling equilibrium due to the
signaling costs incurred by agents. Their paper adopts Spence’s [20] convention
that signaling costs are wasted; their equilibrium is logically equivalent to an all pay
auction. Johnson [13] observes that signaling costs in these environments are often
not wasted; many matching markets are run by a self-interested matchmaker serving
as an information broker who receives the signaling costs as her payment. John-
son constructs revenue-maximizing auctions that implement truncated assortative
matching. Both [11] and [13] implement their solutions as Bayesian Nash equilibria;
while they achieve positive assortative matching (or in the case of [13], a truncation
thereof) agents experience ex post regret due to the payment structure in Bayesian
implementation. Bayesian implementation also assumes common knowledge of the
distribution of agents’ respective qualities.
Ex post Nash equilibrium is an attractive implementation choice as it is dis-
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tribution independent and regret free. This paper constructs an efficient, ex post
incentive compatible mechanism for any incomplete information matching market in
which the match surplus functions are increasing and supermodular in each agent’s
one-dimensional partner quality, including the marriage markets of [11] and [13]. I
describe a natural generalization of the marriage markets of [11] and [13] to a large
class of matching markets in which positive assortative matching is the unique ef-
ficient stable match. I then introduce the VCG-like mechanism that unifies these
markets in a single framework and prove that this mechanism always implements
positive assortative matching as an ex post Nash equilibrium; in particular, this
mechanism works in both one-, two-, and many-sided matching markets. This equi-
librium is slightly stronger than ex post Nash equilibrium; I show that the idea of
locally envy free equilibrium introduced by Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz [5]
generalizes completely to this class of incomplete information environments.
2.2 Examples
The following examples of roommate and marriage matching give the flavor of
the mechanism and intuition for its payment rule. In both examples, the reservation
payoff is 0.
2.2.1 Roommates
There are three agents and one room with two identical beds. Each agent n has
privately known roommate quality xn ∈ [0, 1]. If agents n and n′ each receive one
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of the beds, n receives s(xn, xn′) and n
′ receives s(xn′ , xn) where s(·, ·) is increasing
in both arguments and supermodular. These requirements on s(·, ·) are sufficient
to guarantee that positive assortative matching is the unique efficient stable match.
Without loss of generality assume that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3. Each agent reports her quality
to the mechanism which implements positive assortative matching: the agents who
submit the two highest reports receive one bed each. The agent who submits the
lowest report receives no bed and the reservation payoff 0. Denote agent n’s report
x̂n to distinguish her reported quality from her actual quality. When each agent
reports her quality truthfully, agents 1 and 2 each receive a bed in the positive
assortative match. The positive assortative match yields the match surpluses shown
in the table.
Agent Roommate Surplus Payment
1 2 s(x1, x2) s(bx3, bx2)
2 1 s(x2, x1) s(bx3, bx1)
3 - 0 0
Truthful reporting forms an ex post Nash equilibrium under the payments
shown in the table: when any two agents report their qualities truthfully, the third
cannot profitably deviate from reporting her own quality truthfully. For example,
suppose agents 2 and 3 report their qualities truthfully: if agent 1 reports x̂1 ≥ x3,
she receives one of the beds, pays s(x3, x2), and receives payoff s(x1, x2)−s(x3, x2) ≥
0 because s(·, ·) is increasing in its first argument. If agent 1 reports x̂1 < x3, she
receives no bed and the reservation payoff 0. Since x1 ≥ x3, agent 1 is at least as
well off reporting her quality truthfully as she would selecting any other report.
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Agent 1’s report has two effects: her report (1) deprives agent 3 of a bed and
(2) affects the value of agent 2’s match surplus. The intuition for agent 1’s payment
is that she should pay the opportunity cost she imposes on agent 3 by depriving
her of a bed, but should not pay for her effect on agent 2, whom she deprived of
nothing. Similarly, agent 2’s payment is the opportunity cost she imposes on agent
3, but her effect on agent 1, whom she deprived of nothing. Agent 3, who deprives
neither agent 1 nor 2 of a bed, pays 0. Another way to describe the payment rule is
that for each agent n, the mechanism identifies the set of other agents with whom
n is effectively in competition: in the above example agents 1 and 2 are not ex post
in competition for a bed.
2.2.2 Marriage
The marriage market’s structure differs significantly from the roommate mar-
ket: the list of possible partners for a man (woman) is restricted to women (men),
whereas in the roommate market any agent may match with any other. However,
despite this difference, all of the observations from the roommate example apply to
this marriage example.
Suppose that there are two men and two women. Each man i has privately
known quality mi ∈ [0, 1] and each woman j has privately known quality wj ∈ [0, 1].
If man i and woman j are matched, the man receives sM(mi, wj) and the woman
receives sW (wj,mi) where both sM(·, ·) and sW (·, ·) are increasing in both arguments
and supermodular; these conditions on sM(·, ·) and sW (·, ·) are sufficient to guarantee
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that positive assortative matching is the unique efficient stable match. Suppose
without loss of generality that m1 ≥ m2 and w1 ≥ w2. Each agent reports his
(her) type to the mechanism which implements positive assortative matching: the
man with the higher report (of the two men) is matched with the woman with the
higher report (of the two women), and the man with the lower report is matched
with the woman with the lower report. Denote man i’s (woman j’s) report m̂i (ŵj)
to distinguish his (her) report from his (her) quality. When each agent reports his
(her) quality truthfully the positive assortative match pairs man 1 with woman 1
and man 2 with woman 2. The positive assortative match yields the match surpluses
shown in the table.
Agent Spouse Surplus Payment
M1 W1 sM (m1, w1) sM ( bm2, bw1)− sM ( bm2, bw2)
M2 W2 sM (m2, w2) 0
W1 M1 sW (w1,m1) sW ( bw2, bm1)− sW ( bw2, bm2)
W2 M2 sW (w2,m2) 0
Truthful reporting again forms an ex post Nash equilibrium under the pay-
ments shown in the table: when any three agents report their qualities truthfully,
the remaining agent cannot profitably deviate from reporting truthfully him/herself.
The intuition behind the payment rule in the marriage market is identical to the
intuition behind the payment rule in the roommate market: an agent’s payment
should be the total opportunity cost imposed on other agents whom his (her) report
displaced from a marriage. The two-sided structure of the marriage market means
that a man (woman) can only displace another man (woman) from a match; a man
cannot displace a woman and a woman cannot displace a man. In this example, M1
displaces M2 from marriage with W1. Therefore, his payment is the opportunity cost
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he imposes on M2 by preventing him from marrying W1. However, M1’s payment
does not include the opportunity cost he imposes on either woman because he does
not (and cannot) displace either woman from a marriage.
2.3 Model
There is a set of agents N = {1, · · · , N}, a set of bins B = {1, · · · , B}, and
a set of roles R = {1, · · · , R}. A bin b is a set of open slots, each of which can be
occupied by at most one agent acting in a role r specified by the bin. Each bin b
has a publicly known number of slots cb,r ≥ 0 for each role r; assume that ci,r ≥ cj,r




Each agent n has privately known type xn : R → [0, 1] where xn(r) denotes n’s
quality if she occupies a role r slot. Assume that each agent n has one productive
role rn ∈ R; for all r 6= rn, xn(r) = 0. There are some matching markets (such as
marriage markets) in which an agent’s productive role is public information and oth-
ers (such as labor markets) in which it may be private. The results hold even when
every agent’s productive role is private information, so assume that it is private.
Assume also that the xn are independently distributed. Let x = [x1 x2 · · · xN ],
x−n = [x1 · · · xn−1 xn+1 · · · xN ], and (x−n, z) = [x1 · · · xn−1 z xn+1 · · · xN ].
An assignment is a function mapping agents to slots in bins. Formally, it is a
function µ : N → B ×R∪ (0, 0) which satisfies
1. µ(n) = (0, 0) if and only if n is unmatched, i.e. µ assigns n to no slot in any
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bin
2. µ(n) = (b, r) if and only if agent n occupies a slot in role r in bin b
3. All capacity constraints are satisfied, i.e. |µ−1(b, r)| ≤ cb,r for all (b, r)
Let A denote the set of all functions µ satisfying items 1 - 3 above, and let φ :
B × R → B and ρ : B × R → R denote the canonical projections. Let µ = ρ ◦ µ.
For all agents n, denote the set of n’s partners in role r by
Wµ(n, r) =

{i ∈ N\{n} |φ ◦ µ(i) = φ ◦ µ(n) and ρ ◦ µ(i) = r} if φ ◦ µ(n) 6= 0




(xk1(r), xk2(r), · · · , xk|Wµ(n,r)|(r), 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
cb,r−|Wµ(n,r)|
) if µ(n) 6= r
(xk1(r), xk2(r), · · · , xk|Wµ(n,r)|(r), 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
cb,r−1−|Wµ(n,r)|
) if µ(n) = r
where k1 < k2 < · · · k|Wµ(n,r)| ∈ Wµ(n, r). Note that yn(µ, r) is an ordered cb,r-tuple
when µ(n) 6= r and an ordered (cb,r − 1)-tuple when µ(n) 6= r. Finally, let
yn(µ) = (yn(µ, 1), yn(µ, 2), · · · , yn(µ,R))
An agent who occupies a slot in her productive role derives private match
surplus from her interactions with other agents in the same bin. An agent who is
unmatched or occupies a slot not in her productive role receives a match surplus of
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zero. For each bin b and role r, there is a known private surplus function sb,r : [0, 1]×
[0, 1]cb−1 → R that is weakly increasing in all arguments and weakly supermodular.
Agent n who occupies a slot in bin b in role r receives sb,r(xn(r), yn(µ)). Assume
that sb,r(0, yn) = 0 for all b, r and yn; intuitively, an agent whose quality in role r is
0 and who works in role r receives match surplus 0.
The conditions on the sb,r together with the structure of the bins’ capacity
constraints imply that positive assortative matching is the unique efficient stable
match in this model.1 In this model, the positive assortative match is the result
of implementing the following process in the full information analog of the model
environment.
1. Sort agents by productive role; within each role r, rank them from highest to
lowest by quality.
2. Among agents whose productive role is 1, assign the c1,1 highest quality agents
to bin 1, the next c2,1 highest quality agents to bin 2, and so on until there
are no more agents whose productive role is 1 or until all role 1 jobs at all B
bins are filled.
3. Repeat Step 2 for roles 2, · · · , R.
Let L ⊆ {1, · · · , N} be the set of agents in a bin in their respective productive
roles. Agent n’s match surplus is
∑
i∈L\{n} srn(xn(rn), xi(ri)). Agents’ utilities are
1Shapley and Shubik [19] were the first to observe that in a two-sided one-to-one matching
market, supermodularity implies that positive assortative matching is the unique efficient stable
match.
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Under the assignment µ, agent n receives match surplus
sb,r(xn(µ(n)), yn(µ))
If µ(n) = (0, 0), agent n’s match surplus is necessarily 0 since Wµ(n) = ∅. The social




An unmatched agent or an agent not matched in her productive role receives match
surplus zero and contributes zero to the social surplus.
2.4 Mechanism Design
A mechanism is a pair of functions {q, t} that take as their arguments messages
from the N agents, and respectively map those messages into a lottery over assign-
ments and a payment vector. A direct mechanism is one in which each agent’s
message space exactly coincides with her type space. By the revelation princi-
ple [15], restriction to direct mechanisms proceeds without loss of generality. Let
x̂n denote agent n’s report, x̂ = [x̂1 x̂2 · · · x̂N ], x̂−n = [x̂1 · · · x̂n−1 x̂n+1 · · · x̂N ],
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and (x̂−n, z) = [x̂1 · · · x̂n−1 z x̂n+1 · · · x̂N ]. The report x̂n = 0 denotes the zero
function on R. Let ∆A denote the lottery space over A and let Θ = {x : R →
[0, 1] |x is a function}. A direct mechanism in this model is a pair of functions
{q, t} where q : ΘN → ∆A and t : ΘN → RN . Let qµ(x̂) be the probability that µ
occurs under the lottery q(x̂). The nth coordinate tn(x̂) of t(x̂) denotes agent n’s
payment. A mechanism is feasible if and only if
∑
µ∈A
qµ(x̂) ≤ 1 for all x̂ ∈ ΘN (2.1)
and
qµ(x̂) ≥ 0 for all x̂ ∈ ΘN and for all µ ∈ A (2.2)
Agent n’s expected surplus under the lottery q(x̂−n, x̂n) is







Agent n’s payoff when representing quality x̂n and the other agents represent x̂−n
is
Un(q, t, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) = Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn)− tn(x̂−n, x̂n) (2.3)
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A mechanism is ex post individually rational if and only if
Un(q, t,x−n, xn,x−n, xn) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N (2.4)
In other words, in equilibrium each agent must be at least as well off participating
as not.
In order for agents to reveal their respective types truthfully to the mechanism,
an incentive compatibility constraint must hold.
Definition 2.4.1. A mechanism is ex post incentive compatible if for all xn, x̂n ∈ Θ
and n ∈ N
Un(q, t,x−n, xn,x−n, xn) ≥ Un(q, t,x−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) (2.5)
Ex post incentive compatibility requires that for each agent n, when all other
agents’ types are revealed, n cannot profitably deviate from truthful reporting. Al-
ternatively, truthful revelation forms an ex post Nash equilibrium.
2.5 VCG-like Mechanism: R = 1
This section restricts attention to R = 1 and suppresses role-specific notation
and language; there is one role which by default is the productive role for each
agent. This restriction makes it possible to illustrate the payment rule with minimal
technical and notational complications. Agent n’s type is simply her quality xn ∈
[0, 1]. An assignment is a function µ : N → B ∪ {0} such that
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1. µ(n) = 0 if and only if n is unmatched, i.e. µ assigns n no slot in any bin
2. µ(n) = b if and only if agent n occupies a slot in bin b
3. All capacity constraints are satisfied, i.e. |µ−1(b)| ≤ cb for all b
2.5.1 Existence and Structure of the VCG-like Mechanism
The mechanism of this section is the natural and correct generalization of the
well-known VCG mechanism to a one-sided matching environment in which positive









In other words, µ∗bx is efficient given the report profile x̂. Since the model structure
guarantees that the positive assortative match is the unique efficient assignment, µ∗bx
must be the positive assortative match given x̂. The key insight of this extension
is that an agent’s payment the opportunity cost she imposes on agent(s) whom she
displaces from a bin, rather than every agent on whom she has an effect.
The set of agents displaced from a bin by agent n is





















Agent n’s payment is tn(x̂) = αn(x̂)− βn(x̂).
The VCG-like mechanism operates as follows. Agents simultaneously and
independently report their respective types to the mechanism, which selects the
socially optimal assignment µ∗bx. If there are multiple socially optimal assignments
due to identical reports by one or more agents, the mechanism chooses a socially
optimal assignment at random. Each agent receives vn(x̂) and pays tn(x̂).
The VCG-like flavor of this mechanism is now apparent: the mechanism selects
a socially optimal assignment given x̂, and charges each agent n the opportunity cost
she imposes on agents in Dn(x̂). In an independent private values setting, Dn(x̂)
is perforce the set of all agents on whom n imposes any opportunity cost. In the
interdependent value setting of this matching market, the payment rule needs to be
more circumspect about which opportunity costs appear in an agent’s payment and
which do not in order to satisfy incentive compatibility.
Theorem 2.5.1. Truthful reporting is an ex post Nash equilibrium in the VCG-like
mechanism.
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Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Ex post incentive compatibility is the strongest achievable implementation
choice; Williams and Radner [22] showed that interdependent values preclude im-
plementation in dominant strategies.
Theorem 2.5.2. (Williams and Radner) Positive assortative matching in the in-
terdependent value environment of this paper is never implementable in dominant
strategies.
Theorem 2.5.2 follows from a lemma that generalizes Myerson’s [15] well-known
auction implementability result.
Lemma 2.5.3. Truthful reporting in a feasible, individually rational direct mecha-
nism is
1. a dominant strategy if and only if for all n and x̂−n, Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) is
supermodular in (x̂n, xn) and







Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n, x̂−n, z)
]∣∣∣∣bxn=z dz
2. ex post incentive compatible if and only if for all n and x−n, Hn(q,x−n, x̂n,x−n, xn)
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is supermodular in (x̂n, xn) and









Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2.5.3 now implies Theorem 2.5.2.
Proof. Suppose that there is a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism
that implements positive assortative matching. Suppose that xn = 0 for n =
2, · · · , N and x̂n = 1 − ε for n = 2, · · · , N . Suppose also that x1 = 1. If agent
1 reports truthfully x̂1 = 1, she wins a slot in bin 1 with c1 − 1 randomly assigned
bin-mates. She receives (c1−1)s(1, 0) = 0. According to the payment rule in Lemma
2.5.3






Hn(q, x̂−1, x̂1, x̂−1, z)
]∣∣∣∣bx1=z dz
= (c1 − 1)s(1− ε, 1− ε) > 0.
Agent 1’s payoff is −(c1 − 1)s(1 − ε, 1 − ε) < 0. By reporting x̂1 = 0 she would
have received non-negative surplus and paid 0. Agents 2, · · · , N have types and
strategies that make truth-telling strictly worse for agent 1 than some other option
(in this example, reporting 0). This statement is exactly that truthful reporting is
not weakly dominant, a contradiction.
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Consider the following naive extension of the VCG mechanism to this matching
environment, which assigns the positive assortative match given reports x̂ and in













In particular, Theorem 2.5.2 implies that truthful reporting is not, in this
environment, a dominant strategy in the naive extension of the VCG mechanism.
Due to the interdependence, an agent’s naive VCG payment tnaiven (x̂) depends on her
own report due to the externalities agent n exerts on other agents in the same bin.
Since an agent’s payment depends on her own report, the naive VCG mechanism
loses its desirable dominant strategy property. Indeed, in this matching model,
truthful reporting does not even form an ex post Nash equilibrium in the naive
VCG mechanism.
Theorem 2.5.4. Truthful reporting does not form an ex post Nash equilibrium in
the naive VCG mechanism.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xN and all agents










is independent of x̂n. For all n









is decreasing in x̂n. Thus when all agents other than n report truthfully, n’s utility-
maximizing report is x̂n = 1 regardless of her true type.
Truthful reporting in this paper’s mechanism is actually slightly stronger than
ex post Nash equilibrium: Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz’s [5] locally envy free
equilibrium extends to this incomplete information environment.
2.5.2 Envy-Free Equilibria
Definition 2.5.1. An ex post Nash equilibrium of a mechanism {q, t} is envy free if
each agent n receives identical payoffs under all µ that receive positive weight under
q(x).
Envy freeness is a stronger condition than ex post incentive compatibility.
Ex post incentive compatibility merely requires that agents be indifferent across
tie-breaking in expectation, while envy freeness requires that agents be ex post
indifferent across tie-breaking.
Theorem 2.5.5. Truthful reporting in the VCG-like mechanism is an envy free
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
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2.6 Multiple Roles
This section examines the mechanism in the fully general model in which
R ≥ 1. With some minor notational modifications and one observation, the results









The set of agents displaced from a bin by agent n is




















Agent n’s payment is tn(x̂) = αn(x̂)−βn(x̂). While notationally more complex than
the payment defined in Section 2.5, the intuition is the same: agent n who wins a
slot in bin b in role r pays the opportunity cost she imposes on agents whom her
report displaces from a bin. An agent’s report can displace another agent from a
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bin if and only if both agents report the same productive role.
The VCG-like mechanism operates exactly as in Section 2.5. Agents submit
their reports to the mechanism, which selects the socially optimal assignment µ∗bx.
If there are multiple socially optimal assignments due to identical reports by one
or more agents, the mechanism chooses a socially optimal assignment at random.
Each agent receives vn(x̂) and pays tn(x̂).
Fix some r ∈ R. If the types of agents whose productive role is not r were
public information, then the remaining mechanism design problem concerning agents
whose productive role is r is identical to the mechanism design problem in which
R = 1 and in which the types of agents whose productive role is not r enter the
match surplus function sr(·, ·) as parameters. The generalization of Section 2.5’s
results relies on the this observation.
Theorem 2.6.1. Truthful reporting is an ex post Nash equilibrium is the VCG-like
mechanism (R ≥ 1).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary r ∈ R and suppose that all agents whose productive role
is not r report their types truthfully. Then set of all agents whose productive role
is r report to a mechanism identical to the mechanism of Section 2.5 in which the
types of the agents whose productive role is not r enter as parameters. Theorem
2.5.1 now implies the result.
Since R ≥ 1 includes the case R = 1, [22]’s result that there is no dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanism still holds.
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Theorem 2.6.2. Truthful reporting in the VCG-like mechanism is an envy free
equilibrium (R ≥ 1).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary r ∈ R and suppose that all agents whose productive role
is not r report their types truthfully. The set of all agents whose productive role
is r report to a mechanism identical to the mechanism of Section 2.5 in which the
types of the agents whose productive role is not r enter as parameters. Within each
role, truthful reporting is envy free. Thus when all agents report truthfully, truthful
reporting is envy free across all roles.
Last, using a generalization of Lemma 2.5.3 to R roles, we show that up to
a constant, the VCG-like mechanism is revenue equivalent to all other (Bayesian)
incentive compatible mechanisms that implement positive assortative matching.
Lemma 2.6.3. Truthful reporting in a feasible, individually rational direct mecha-
nism is
1. a dominant strategy if and only if for all n and x̂−n, Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) is
supermodular in (x̂n, xn) and







Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n, x̂−n, z)
]∣∣∣∣bxn=z dz
2. ex post incentive compatible if and only if for all n and x−n, Hn(q,x−n, x̂n,x−n, xn)
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is supermodular in (x̂n, xn) and









3. Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if for all n and x̂−n,
Ex−n [Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n, x̂−n, xn)]
is supermodular in x̂n, xn and








Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n, x̂−n, z)
]∣∣∣∣bxn=z dz
Proof. Fix an arbitrary r ∈ R and suppose that all agents whose productive role
is not r report their types truthfully. The set of all agents whose productive role
is r report to a mechanism identical to the mechanism of Section 2.5 in which the
types of the agents whose productive role is not r enter as parameters. The proof
of Lemma 2.5.3 then applies to each role.
Corollary 2.6.4. A matching mechanism’s expected revenue is completely deter-
mined by q and the (expected) payoff of to an agent whose quality is 0 in her pro-
ductive role.
Proof. Recall that Bayesian incentive compatibility implies ex post incentive com-
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patibility, so that proving the revenue equivalence of Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanisms includes revenue equivalence of ex post incentive compatible mecha-
nisms. Equation (2.10) says that the expected payment of an agent n depends
exclusively on q and Ex−n [Un(q, t, x̂−n, 0, x̂−n, 0)]. The mechanism’s expected rev-
enue is the sum of expected payments, hence expected revenue depends solely on q
and Ex−n [Un(q, t, x̂−n, 0, x̂−n, 0)].
2.6.1 Marriage Markets and Internet Advertising
A marriage market is a matching market in which the matched unit is a
household, the two productive roles are man and woman, the N agents consist
of K men and L women. The number of households is not a binding constraint;
B ≥ min{K,L}. Each household b has capacity constraints cb,man = cb,woman = 1.
Each man reports his quality and each woman reports her quality to the mechanism,
and the man and woman reporting the kth highest qualities in their respective roles
are matched.
The complete information version of this marriage market encapsulates the
internet advertising market of [5]. Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz study the
generalized second price (GSP) auction run by internet search engines for sponsored
search slots. The search engine side of the market pays nothing; the qualities of
the sponsored search slots (measured as the probability of a click) are known to
all advertisers, with higher-ranked slots having higher click-through rates. The
advertisers bid for slots; the kth highest bidder wins the kth best sponsored search
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slot and pays the k + 1st highest bid. The k + 1st highest bid in the GSP auction
exactly coincides with the kth highest bidder’s payment in the VCG-like mechanism.
2.6.2 Many-to-One Matching
A labor market is a matching market in which the matched unit is a firm, and
each firm hires agents into one or more productive roles. Classical models consider
two roles, manager and worker. This model and mechanism are capable of handling
any finite number of roles. A university, for example, might hire a one president,
several provosts, many deans, full, associate, and assistant professors and staff. The
N agents consist of all candidates eligible to fill whatever roles are available.
This example details the mechanism in a matching market between hospitals
and doctors. This market has two productive roles, hospital h and doctor d. There
are two empty bins. The capacity constraints are c1h = c2h = 1, c1d = 2, and
c2d = 1. Hospitals and doctors report their respective qualities to the mechanism
which matches the best hospital with the best doctors (until c1d is satisfied or until
the supply of doctors is exhausted) and the second best hospital with the next best
doctors. Suppose that there are six agents {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and two bins {1, 2}. Agent
1’s and 2’s productive roles are h, and agent 3’s, 4’s, 5’s, and 6’s productive roles
are d. Without loss of generality, suppose that x1(h) ≥ x2(h) and x3(d) ≥ x4(d) ≥





Agent Wµ∗x (n) Dn(x) Wµ∗x−n,0
(k)
1 {3, 4} {2} Wµ∗x−1,0
(2) = {3, 4}
2 {5} ∅ ∅
3 {1, 4} {5, 6} Wµ∗x−3,0
(5) = {1, 4}
Wµ∗x−3,0
(6) = {2}
4 {1, 3} {5, 6} Wµ∗x−4,0
(5) = {1, 3}
Wµ∗x−4,0
(6) = {2}
5 {2} {6} Wµ∗x−5,0
(6) = {2}
6 ∅ ∅ ∅
The VCG-like mechanism results in the following assignment, surpluses, and
payments:























































































6 ∅ 0 0
Truthful reporting is an envy free equilibrium: if two agents with the same
productive role have the same quality, their payoffs are equal. For example, if
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(2) = Wµ∗x(1), these expressions are equal when x1(h) = x2(h). Sim-
ilarly, if x5(d) = x6(d), doctors 5 and 6 each receive 0. This suggests a natural
interpretation of payoffs as wages. If agents in a given role have approximately the
same qualities, wages tend to compress. In the limiting case where x1(h) = x2(h)
the two hospitals each receive payoff 0. A similar observation obtains for doctors
when x3(d) = x4(d) = x5(d) = x6(d). If agents’ qualities in some role r are more
homogeneous, there is less to be gained by offering higher wages for higher quality
agents.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that all incomplete information matching markets in which
positive assortative matching on agent quality is the unique efficient stable match
can be unified under a single mechanism design framework. The resulting VCG-
like mechanism is new to the literature and always implements positive assortative
matching as ex post Nash equilibrium. Indeed, this equilibrium satisfies the slightly
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stronger condition of envy freeness introduced by [5] and generalizes locally envy
freeness to the incomplete information matching environments considered here. The
main contribution of this work is the correct generalization of the VCG mechanism
to the interdependent values setting of these matching markets: the payment rule
distinguishes between the opportunity cost an agent imposes on another by depriving
that other agent of an object (a slot in a given bin) and the opportunity cost an
agent imposes on another by changing the value of that other agent’s won object
(due to interdependence). In order for truthful reporting to form an ex post Nash
equilibrium, each agent’s payment must be based on the former but exclude the
latter. One drawback to this mechanism is that in a matching market (unlike a
pure auction environment) agents have an incentive to try to match outside the
mechanism to avoid making payments. While this problem disappears under the
assumption that the mechanism can prevent agents from matching outside, a more
elegant approach would be a revenue-neutral extension of the mechanism.
Of particular note is the unification of one-sided and two-sided matching mar-
kets. These types of markets typically display very different behaviors; this paper
is the only one of which this author is aware that links these two types of markets;
further work on such relationships would prove interesting albeit difficult.
Thus far, progress on incomplete information matching problems has been
limited to markets in which positive assortative matching is the unique stable effi-
cient match. Interesting avenues for future work include relaxing the restrictions on
surplus functions that force us to restrict our attention to positive assortative match-




Chapter 3: Mitigating Matching Externalities Via The “Old Boys’
Club”
3.1 Introduction
This paper shows how a persistent contracting relationship emerges in a re-
peated college admissions market from a randomly initiated one-shot contract of-
fered by an unbiased expected utility maximizing college. Faced with an admissions
problem that cannot be addressed by an efficient, incentive compatible market de-
sign, a college offers a contract to a randomly selected high school; they agree that
the college will admit some number of the high school’s most promising students
immediately. The high school agrees to this contract because it is happy to guar-
antee admission for as many of its students as possible in advance of the general
admissions market. The college offers this contract for two reasons: first, it too is
happy to guarantee itself sufficiently good students in advance of the general ad-
missions market; second, contracting away some its slots reduces the complexity of
its general admissions market design problem. The contracted high school will not
renege on the contract in the sense of sending subpar students to fill the contracted
slots because the college learns from the general admissions market whether the con-
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tracted high school reneged. The college credibly promises to reward the contracted
high school’s compliance with a future contract and credibly threatens to punish the
contracted high school’s noncompliance by contracting with some other high school
in one or more subsequent rounds of admissions.
An obvious objection grounded in a human sense of equity arises: the high
school holding the contract is at a distinct advantage since students admitted via
the contracted slots avoid the need to compete in the general admissions market.
Moreover, the method of contract enforcement guarantees that if the initially con-
tracted high school is sufficiently patient, it will honor the contract in every round of
admissions, guaranteeing that its contracting relationship will persist ad infinitum.
This paper assumes that the high schools are ex ante identical and the college is ex
ante unbiased in the sense that it offers the initial contract at random. Nevertheless,
the lifetime welfare loss to a non-contracted high school is large. In the context of
college admissions in the United States, intertwined with historical cultural biases
that favor of certain demographics over others, it leaves the uncomfortable conclu-
sion that merely mandating equal consideration of all applicants is insufficient to
dismantle these long standing relationships, hereinafter referred to as “old boys’
clubs.”
Matching markets in which there is no mechanism that is both efficient and
incentive compatible abound; indeed this type of market is the rule rather than the
exception. The main results in this vein are due to Vickrey [21], who showed that
there is no budget-balanced auction in which both buyers and sellers reveal their pri-
vate values truthfully; Roth [18], who showed that there is no matching mechanism
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in which participants on both sides of the market reveal their preferences truthfully;
and Jehiel and Moldovanu [12], who showed that in multi-unit auctions with mul-
tidimensional signals there is in general no efficient, incentive compatible auction
mechanism. The lack of a mechanism that is both efficient and incentive compatible
does not mitigate the need of participants in these markets to form matches by some
means, however imperfect the method or outcome may be. A college faced with this
problem nonetheless needs to admit a freshman class every year: educating students
is its raison d’être. It is therefore natural to study inefficient but incentive compat-
ible mechanisms to understand both how these mechanisms perform and how their
inefficiencies are distributed. Both the initial contract and its persistence are com-
pletely understandable from the classical economic standpoint of selfish, expected
utility maximizing agents. However, despite ex ante equal expected lifetime payoffs
for the high schools, as soon as the initial contract is signed, one high school benefits
from being a member of the “old boys’ club” in every subsequent round while the
other is left out forever. The college benefits from the “old boys’ club” regardless of
which high school belongs to the club; however, once established, the college needs
to maintain the contracting relationship in order to keep the good students coming
from the contracted high school.
There are two main lenses through which to view these results. One option
is in the tradition of Chatterjee and Samuelson’s work on bilateral trade [3]. That
work characterizes how frequently a natural trading mechanism is ex post inefficient,
and how costly that inefficiency is to the trading partners. This paper considers a
matching mechanism that is ex post inefficient and shows that it outperforms other
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candidate mechanisms. A second point of view sees this work as the generalization
of Ausubel et. al.’s work on demand reduction in auctions [2] to matching environ-
ments. The college knows that it wants to admit a valedictorian, but it does not
know which one. In expectation, it can admit one valedictorian at no cost to itself.
From the high schools’ perspective, if the college were auctioning both slots, the
high school whose valedictorian was admitted should reduce demand and have her
valedictorian admitted for free. The contracting stage of this paper’s admissions
game is analogous to the contracted high school reducing demand; the subsequent
Vickrey auction is analogous to the auction for the remaining unit. Unlike a pure
auction environment, the matching game must repeat since demand reduction is
accomplished by contract rather than by the auction itself.
3.2 Model
There is one college C and two high schools H1 and H2. In each round of
admissions, C has two slots for incoming freshmen and each high school has two
graduating seniors. Each period, the college faces the problem of choosing two of the
four graduating seniors to fill its freshman class. The college and two high schools
repeat this admissions process infinitely many times, with common discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1) between periods. The college seeks to maximize the total lifetime payoff
of its matriculated students, while each high school seeks to maximize the total
lifetime payoff of its graduates.
Students at the high schools have types independently drawn from a publicly
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known, common density f(·) with support [0, a] ⊆ [0,∞) and corresponding dis-
tribution F (·). Assume that f(·) is sufficiently well behaved that every integral of
interest in this paper converges. Each high school knows the type of each of its
two students but not the types of the students at the other high school; the college
does not know the types of any students. If students of types θ1 and θ2 matriculate
to C in some period, student θ1 receives payoff U(θ1, θ2) and student θ2 receives
payoff U(θ2, θ1), where U(·, ·) is non-negative increasing in both arguments, strictly
supermodular, bounded and integrable on [0, a]4. A student who does not go to
college receives outside option 0. Herein lies C’s market design impossibility: strict
supermodularity in U(·, ·) implies sufficient payoff interdependence to preclude a
mechanism that is both efficient and incentive compatible [12].
The college fully internalizes its matriculated students’ payoffs; each high
school fully internalizes its graduates’ payoffs.
Let s1n ≥ s2n denote the types of H1’s period n good and bad students respec-
tively; let t1n ≥ t2n denote the types of H2’s period n good and bad students respec-
tively. Thus by standard combinatorial reasoning, (s1n, s2n, t1n, t2n) has joint density
4f(s1n)f(s2n)f(t1n)f(t2n) and its support is {(x, y, z, w) ∈ [0, a]4|x ≥ y and z ≥ w}.
Abusing notation, I use a student’s type as her identifier. Let Xin denote the
ith best student and her type (across both high schools) in period n.
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3.3 Contracting Mechanism
This section considers the novel combined contracting and auction admissions
mechanism of this paper. In the contracting regime, C offers a randomly chosen
high school a contract for its good student and runs a Vickrey auction to assign its
remaining slot. If C offers Hi the contract in period n, Hi always accepts since it
prefers to guarantee a berth for at least one of its students. The subsequent Vickrey
auction allows C to identify and admit the best of the remaining three students as
well as to discern before period n + 1 whether the contracted high school honored
the period n contract (sent its good student on the contract) or reneged (sent its bad
student). Let qn be the probability that C contracts with H1 in period n. Period n
































































































H1 learns s1n, s2n
H2 learns t1n, t2n
Pr = qn: C and H1 contract
H1 learns s1n, s2n
H2 learns t1n, t2n
Pr = 1− qn: C and H2 contract
H1 H2
honor renege honor renege
C C
Vickrey auction
for the last slot
Vickrey auction
for the last slot











qn+1 ∈ [0, 1] qn+1 ∈ [0, 1]
Game repeats Game repeats
   
I show that there is a distribution-independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
this game in which C and a sufficiently patient high school contract in every period,
and the contracted high school honors the contract every time.
Theorem 3.3.1. Consider the following strategies in the contracting game:
1. C chooses probability q0 ∈ (0, 1) with which it offers H1 the contract in period
0
2. C offers H1 the contract in period n with probability qn
3. If offered the contract in period n, Hi accepts and honors the contract by send-
ing C its good student immediately to fill the contracted slot
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4. C runs a Vickrey auction to assign the remaining slot and admits the student
with the higher report in the auction regardless of high school of origin
5. In the Vickrey auction, each high school honestly reports the type of its better
(and possibly only) remaining student
6. C discerns from the reports in the Vickrey auction whether the contracted high
school played “honor” or “renege” and chooses qn+1 according to
qn+1 =

1 if H1 played “honor” in period n or H2 played “renege” in period n
0 if H1 played “renege” in period n or H2 played “honor” in period n







A(s20, s10)− A(s10, s20)
E[A(s1k, s2k)]−B
∣∣∣∣ (s10, s20) ∈ [0, a]× [0, a] and s10 ≥ s20}




E[U(s1k, t1k)|s1k ≥ t2k]
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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This perfect Bayesian equilibrium is distribution-independent insofar as the
players do not condition their strategies on the students’ type distribution. However,
I still allow δ to depend on the distribution of students’ types and the surplus
function U(·, ·). The college’s updating rule for qn+1 serves to enforce the contract
and improves total welfare, as well as making the college and the contracted high
school individually better off.
This enforcement and social improvement comes at the expense of the high
school that is not offered the contract in period 0. The college C and the period 0
contracted high school thus form an “old boys’ club” in the sense that contracting
in period 0 ensures that they contract forever; the high school with no contract
in period 0 is shut out from the benefits of this relationship. In each period the
contracting game is ex post efficient with probability 5/6 since it selects the ex post
efficient match unless the top two overall students are from the non-contracted high
school. Assuming without loss off generality that H1 wins the period 0 contract,
H1 receives U(s1n, s2n) + U(s2n, s1n) when its students are the two best period n
students overall, U(s1n, t1n) when both valedictorians are admitted, and U(s1n, t1n)
when H2’s students are the two best period n students overall. The respective
probabilities of these events are 1/6, 2/3, and 1/6.
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Since U(·, ·) increasing in both arguments, this result follows immediately.
Theorem 3.3.2. The high school which wins the period 0 contract receives strictly
higher payoff in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium described in Theorem 3.3.1.
3.4 Performance
Having identified a distribution-independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
the contracting game, I now compare its performance to two other incentive com-
patible matching mechanisms and to the socially optimal outcome under full infor-
mation. This paper will consider the following options in addition to the contracting
game of Section 3.3.
1. random admission in every period
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2. C admits the valedictorians from H1 and H2 respectively
After describing each method, agents’ equilibrium behavior, and expected surplus,
this section will show that contracting is most likely to be ex post efficient, followed
by admitting the valedictorians, and that random matching fares worst. Finally, I
will consider several examples with explicit closed forms for f(·) and U(·, ·) to give
some idea of the potential attractiveness of contracting relative to the other options.
3.4.1 Benchmark: Socially Optimal Matching
Under the unattainable full information benchmark, positive assortative match-
ing is the unique socially optimal and C−optimal outcome [19]. C admits the top
two of the four students, regardless of their high school(s) of origin. Lifetime ex
















δnE[U(X1n, X2n) + U(X2n, X1n)]
The high schools’ respective ex ante expected payoffs are equal since the probabilities
that a given high school has zero, one, or two of the best two students are identical
across high schools. Full efficiency always occurs under full information.
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3.4.2 Alternative Matching Mechanisms
3.4.2.1 Random Matching
If C abandons all efforts at extracting students’ information it avoids any in-
centive problems at considerable loss of efficiency. Let w and z denote the randomly
















δnE[U(w, z) + U(z, w)]
This method is ex post efficient in period n when C randomly chooses the top two
students overall in that period; this event occurs with probability 1/6. The high
schools’ respective ex ante expected payoffs are equal since the probabilities that C
chooses zero, one, or two of a high school’s students are equal across high schools.
3.4.2.2 Admit The Valedictorians
An intermediate option for C is to ask each high school to identify its good
student in each period, and admit the good student from each high school. With
probability 1, it is strictly dominant for each high school to reveal its valedictorian
truthfully since the high school’s payoff increases in its admitted student’s type.1
1If Hi’s students are identical, truthful revelation is only weakly dominant, but this event occurs
with probability 0.
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δnE[U(X1n, X2n) + U(X2n, X1n)]
This method is ex post efficient in period n so long as the two valedictorians are the
top two students overall in that period; this event occurs with probability 2/3.
3.4.3 Performance
It follows immediately from the payoffs above that the contracting game de-
scribed in Section 3.3 is a social improvement on admitting the valedictorians which
is a social improvement on random matching. The following tables compare perfor-
mance and one period expected surplus of the three matching mechanisms to each
other and to the socially optimal outcome under full information. In the case of
the contracting game, assume that H1 randomly wins the period 0 contract; its one
period payoff in each of the tables is the expected payoff after making the contract
but before learning students’ types.
Mechanism Pr ex post efficient EUC EUH1 EUH2






















Types i.i.d. U [0, 1]; U(x, y) = xy. EU is one period ex ante expectation.
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Mechanism Pr ex post efficient EUC EUH1 EUH2
























Types i.i.d. f(x) = λe−λx; U(x, y) = xy. EU is one period ex ante expectation.
The contracting mechanism is ex post efficient with higher probability than the
candidate static matching mechanisms but cannot and does not attain full efficiency.
The size of the college’s increased payoff and the inequity of its division between the
two high schools is an artifact of the choice of surplus function and distribution of
students’ types.
3.5 Conclusion
Existing impossibility results show that there are many mechanism design
problems lacking an efficient solution. Consequentially, there is relatively little de-
velopment of mechanisms designed for such situations, despite their common occur-
rence. When such mechanisms do exist, they rely on assumptions (often reasonable)
that successful deceit is difficult and therefore rare; therefore, one may simply ignore
the possibility of strategic misrepresentation. I consider an alternative, in which a
relationship is used as a partial substitute for direct information revelation.
This paper introduces a mechanism in a repeated college admissions game
which uses a contracting stage to admit a good student and simplify the informa-
tion elicitation problem in the post-contract admissions market. The college enforces
the contract in each period with the promise of maintaining the contracting rela-
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tionship in the next period. The mechanism is ex post efficient more often than
other plausible incentive compatible mechanisms and thus improves total surplus.
However, the gains of this matching approach are distributed inequitably, and re-
peatedly so. The college and the persistently contracted high school both receive
higher surplus in the contracting game than in the “admit the valedictorians” mech-
anism; however, the non-contracted high school’s surplus drops significantly. The
persistent contracting relationship shows that even when a relationship is initiated
at random, once established an “old boys’ club” consistently exploits non-members
for its own benefit. The college and contracted high school enrich themselves at
considerable cost to the non-contracted high school. Future work will generalize
the model to include N high schools and characterize the mechanism’s performance
with arbitrary type distributions and strictly supermodular payoffs.
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Chapter 4: Matching with Endogenous Firm Creation
4.1 Introduction
Labor market matching studies how firms and employees agree to mutually
beneficial terms while largely ignoring firms’ etiology. This paper studies the labor
market matching outcomes when the dichotomy between firms and workers is not
determined ex ante. Each person in the market has two options for earning money.
One is to own and manage a firm, employing herself and possibly others, and receive
the proceeds of that firm after paying salaries to all other employees if any. The
other is to work at a someone else’s firm and receive a salary in exchange for doing so.
People also receive utility from their enjoyment (or lack thereof) of their employment
conditions. I show that there exist salaries that support the socially optimal division
of people into sets of firms and workers as well as the socially optimal match between
those two sets.
Gale and Shapley [6] introduced matching theory as a fruitful and important
literature which addresses the class of problems concerned with the pairing of mem-
bers of one set with members of another. The major arm of this literature in which
this paper situates itself studies the intersection of matching theory and general
equilibrium. Arrow-Debreu equilibrium works (well) in situations when markets for
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each good are reasonably thick. Workers are at best imperfect substitutes for em-
ployers and jobs are at best imperfect substitutes to workers; as such it makes sense
to view each job and each worker is a unique good. In this environment, classical
welfare theorems function minimally if at all.
Kelso and Crawford [14] developed an elegant a price-adjustment algorithm
resembling an English auction which identifies a match and prices which stably sup-
port it. Assuming the workers are weak gross substitutes, their algorithm converges
to a coalition-proof match. Gul and Stacchetti [8], [9] developed a closely related
theory of labor market matching with money which more fully explored the relation-
ship between auctions and matching. Gul and Stacchetti further showed that the
set of prices supporting coalition-proof matches form a lattice, successfully relating
the structure of stable matches in a labor market with prices to the lattice structure
seen in models of Gale and Shapley [6] and Hatfield and Milgrom [10].
As is standard in this literature, these papers assume a preexisting division
of agents into the two respective sides of the matching market. In many matching
settings, this assumption is entirely reasonable: a student does not open a college
and a college does not get a bachelor’s degree; a resident does not open her own
hospital and a hospital does not complete a residency of its own. This assump-
tion is less tenable in the labor market: firms exist because individuals decide to
undertake opening them. Work lacking this assumption has been treated almost
completely separately by the coalition formation and roommate matching litera-
tures. This paper develops a two-sided matching market in which the partition
between firms and workers is endogenously determined. An agent’s socially optimal
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role is determined by the technology she uses if she owns and manages a firm, her
taste for entrepreneurship, her taste for working for other employers available, and
the salaries available from these various options. Salaries exist that support both
the socially optimal partition of agents into firms and workers, and stably supports
the socially optimal match between them.
4.2 Model
There is a set of agents Ω = {1, 2, · · · , n}. In this model, owning and managing
are synonymous; a firm not managed by its owner generates no utility for any agent.
An agent can own and manage a firm or work for another agent, but not both. The
rest of this paper refers to agents who own and manage firms as firms. It calls all
other agents workers. Let F denote the set of firms and W denote the set of agents
who work at a firm in F. Thus F ∪W = Ω and F ∩W = ∅.
Agent i has a publicly known utility function ui : Ω × R→ R which denotes
her utility of working for agent j at salary sij. Agent i also has a publicly known
production function yi : 2Ω → R which denotes the surplus generated when agent i
opens a firm and employs C ⊆ Ω.
Each agent is risk neutral. If agent i works for agent j, she receives ui(j, sij) =
aij + sij where aij is a constant reflecting i’s exogenous utility for employment with




i∈C\{j} sij where ajj is a constant reflecting j’s exogenous utility
managing a firm and sjj = y
j(C) −
∑
i∈C\{j} sij is the surplus after paying her
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employees’ salaries. For all pairs i, j ∈ Ω, let σij solve ui(j, σij) = ui(i, yi({i})); σij
is the salary such that i indifferent between working for j and working solely for
herself.
Several assumptions are in order. First, I formalize the assumption that firm
ownership and management are synonymous. A firm owner must work at her own
firm in order for that firm to produce anything, i.e.
yj(C) = 0 if j 6∈ C (4.1)
In particular, yj(∅) = 0, which is exactly Kelso and Crawford’s “no free lunch”
assumption.
As in Kelso and Crawford, assume that for all C ⊆ Ω containing j and for all
i 6∈ C,
yj(C ∪ {i})− yj(C) ≥ σij (4.2)
There is no requirement that yj(C ∪ {i}) − yj(C) ≥ 0; I allow the possibility that
an agent i may be destructive for firm j. For example, a firm might hire an intern
who is fundamentally unproductive but finds it worth it to her to pay the firm for
the experience.
Finally, assume that agents, when in W, are gross substitutes per [14]. Suppose

















such that {i ∈ C∗ | sij = s′ij} ⊆ C∗∗. There are three intuitive ways to understand
the gross substitutes condition. First, the gross substitutes condition requires that
if a worker’s salary does not increase, the firm employing that worker can continue
to maximize profits without firing that worker. Alternatively, when firm j increases
sij, it does not affect firm j’s decision about whether to hire agent k 6= i. Finally,
worker i′ marginal product is independent of the identities of i’s coworkers (although
worker i’s marginal product may depend on the number of coworkers she has).
A matching correspondence µ : F → Ω where µ(j) is the set of workers
employed by firm j, and µ−1(i) is agent i’s employer. By Equation 4.1, firm j has
non-negative output if and only if µ satisifies j ∈ µ(j). Say that (F, µ) satisfies the
“no free management” assumption if and only if j ∈ µ(j) for all j ∈ F.
Definition 4.2.1. A partition of Ω is a collection of subsets C1, · · · , Cm of Ω such
that
⋃m
j=1Cj = Ω and Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for all i 6= j.
The pair (F, µ) partitions Ω if
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• j = k if and only if µ(j) ∩ µ(k) 6= ∅
•
⋃
j∈F µ(j) = Ω
Let s = {s1, · · · , sn} denote some salary schedule in which i ∈ Ω receives salary si.
Call (F, µ, s) an allocation whenever (F, µ) partitions Ω, (F, µ) satisfies the “no free
management” assumption, and i ∈ µ(j) receives from j ∈ F salary si specified by
the schedule s. In particular, for all j ∈ F, firm j’s salary according to the schedule






Definition 4.2.2. An allocation (F, µ, s) is individually rational if
• For all i ∈ W
aiµ−1(i) + siµ−1(i) ≥ aii + yi({i})








The first requirement is a “no quit” condition on each worker. The second
requirement is a “no terminations” condition on each firm. A termination is a
unilateral deviation because it is an action taken by a single agent j ∈ F despite
that fact that it may affect more than one of j’s employees.
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Definition 4.2.3. The allocation (F, µ, s) is a core allocation if there is no A ⊆ Ω
for some j ∈ A and salaries sij for all i ∈ A\{j} such that for all i ∈ A.
aij + sij ≥ aiµ−1(i) + si
The pair (F, µ) is a strict core allocation if at least one of these inequalities is strict.
Definition 4.2.3 encapsulates pairwise stability since it necessarily includes
any coalitions of two agents. The next section shows that individual rationality is
sufficient for an allocation to be in the core and that given the socially optimal match
(F, µ) there exists a salary schedule s(F, µ) that supports it as a core allocation.
4.3 Results
I now show that there exist salaries that support a socially optimal partition
of Ω into firms and workers, and stably support a socially optimal match between
the two resulting sets.
Theorem 4.3.1. Suppose that (F ∗, µ∗) is socially optimal, i.e.








Then there exists a salary schedule s∗ = {s∗1, s∗2, · · · , s∗n} such that (F ∗, µ∗, s∗) is a
strict core allocation.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3.
This proof appears as a series of lemmas. The first uses the gross substitutes
condition to establish an inequality concerning the marginal product of an arbitrary
worker. The next four lemmas construct an s∗ such that (F ∗, µ∗, s∗) is individually
rational. Then, a final lemma shows that an individually rational allocation must
be in the core.
There are several ways to interpret this result. One is that it shows that as in
the standard Arrow-Debreu model, prices determine not just the quantity of goods
transacted, but also which agents are sellers and which are buyers. An environment
in which firms and workers are determined ex ante is standard for a matching model,
but it is an unnecessary constraint in general equilibrium. The second interpretation
is that salaries can successfully mediate both technological selection and employer
/ employee preferences simultaneously. A final interpretation says that prices can
transform a one-sided matching problem into a corresponding two-sided market.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper shows that prices provide a means of matching firms and workers
and establishing a socially optimal allocation of agents to these two sides of the
market. The existence of these prices establishes that Kelso and Crawford’s exten-
sion of general equilibrium also correctly partitions agents into two distinct groups,
one of firms - the buyers of labor - and the other of workers - the sellers of labor.
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium correctly partitions agents into buyers and sellers of the
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good(s) in question as well as determining prices. I have shown that Kelso and
Crawford’s labor market setting, there is no need to constrain agents to one side
of the market; even when markets are thin as in this case, prices serve to correctly
identify firms and workers. A possible further generalization is the development of




This dissertation contributes three essays of novel results in matching the-
ory. The first essay contributes a VCG-like matching mechanism applicable to all
matching environments in which the positive assortative match is the unique effi-
cient stable match. Its payment rule recognizes which opportunity costs should be
included and which opportunity costs should be excluded in order to achieve ex
post incentive compatibility. In an environment with no interdependence, this new
mechanism exactly coincides with the standard VCG mechanism. The second essay
develops a hybrid contract and auction mechanism in a college admissions problem
where no efficient incentive compatible mechanism exists. This hybrid mechanism
improves total surplus by establishing a contracting relationship between the college
and a single high school which mitigates some of the inefficiency. However, this so-
cial improvement occurs at the expense of a high school not party to the established
contracting relationship. Finally, I show that in a one-sided labor market, prices
support an efficient division of that single side into firms and workers, as well as
stably supporting a socially optimal match between those sets.
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Appendix A: Appendix
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 2.5.1
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof that truthful revelation is a weakly dominant
strategy in the VCG mechanism.



























































If z < xn, then Dn(x) ⊇ Dn(x−n, z), and Equation (A.1) consequently becomes
















Agents in Dn(x)\Dn(x−n, z) are at least as well off when n reports z as when n
reports 0, thus
vn(x)− tn(x) ≥ vn(x−n, z)− tn(x−n, z)
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Alternatively, if z > xn, then Dn(x) ⊆ Dn(x−n, z), and Equation (A.1) consequently
becomes
















Agents in Dn(x−n, z)\Dn(x) are at least as well off when n reports 0 as when n
reports xn, thus
vn(x)− tn(x) ≥ vn(x−n, z)− tn(x−n, z)
In particular, vn(x)−tn(x) ≥ vn(x−n, 0)−tn(x−n, 0) = 0, so it is ex post individually
rational for agent n to report truthfully.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2.5.3
Proof. This is the proof of part 1 of Lemma 2.5.3; the proof of part 2 follows anal-
ogously.
A mechanism {q, t} is individually rational if for all n ∈ {1, · · · , N}
Un(q, t, x̂−n, xn,x−n, xn) ≥ 0 (A.2)
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A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible if for all n ∈ {1, · · · , N}
and for all xn, x̂n ∈ [0, 1]
Un(q, t, x̂−n, xn,x−n, xn) ≥ Un(q, t, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) (A.3)
First, show that if {q, t} is feasible, individually rational, and dominant strat-
egy incentive compatible, it must satisfy the conditions of part 1 of Lemma 2.5.3.
Rewrite the right hand side of Equation (A.3) as





[s(xn, xi)− s(x̂n, xi)]
 (A.4)
Replace (A.4) into the right hand side of Equation (A.3). Thus the incentive com-
patibility constraint is equivalent to






[s(xn, xi)− s(x̂n, xi)]
 (A.5)
Transpose xn and x̂n in Equation (A.5):






[s(x̂n, xi)− s(xn, xi)]
 (A.6)
Combine Equations (A.5) and (A.6), and rearrange; we see that incentive compati-
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bility is equivalent to the supermodularity of Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) in x̂n, xn:
Hn(q, x̂−n, xn,x−n, xn) +Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, x̂n)
≥ Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) +Hn(q, x̂−n, xn,x−n, x̂n) (A.7)
The payment rule, Equation (2.6), follows from the standard method of equat-
ing the direct and indirect utility functions. Evaluate the incentive compatibility








Un(q, t, x̂−n, x̂n, x̂−n, xn)
]∣∣∣∣bxn=xn (A.8)
Integrating Equation (A.8)







Un(q, t, x̂−n, x̂n, x̂−n, z)
]∣∣∣∣bxn=z dz (A.9)
Since tn(x̂−n, x̂n) is independent of xn, Equation (A.9) is equivalent to







Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n, x̂−n, z)
]∣∣∣∣bxn=z dz (A.10)
Now show that if {q, t} is feasible, individually rational, and satisfies the con-
ditions of part 1 of Lemma 2.5.3, it must be dominant strategy incentive compati-
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ble. Evaluating the second to last arguments of Un and Hn in Equation (A.10) at
x̂−n = x−n







Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, z)
]∣∣∣∣bxn=z dz (A.11)
By Equation (A.11)











Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, z)
]∣∣∣∣bxn=z dz (A.12)
By the supermodularity of Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) in x̂n, xn, we conclude that the
integrand is increasing in its third argument.1 Suppose that xn ≥ x′n. Then


















[s(xn, xi)− s(x′n, xi)]
 (A.14)
1Since Hn(q, x̂−n, x̂n,x−n, xn) is supermodular in x̂n, xn, the cross derivative is non-negative.
Therefore, ∂Hn∂xn must be increasing in x̂n.
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Equation (A.14) is exactly Equation (A.5) with x̂n relabeled as x
′
n. Thus part 1
of Lemma 2.5.3 describes sufficient conditions for a feasible, individually rational
mechanism to be dominant strategy incentive compatible.
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2.5.5
Proof. Suppose that two agents, n and n′ submit identical (truthful) reports. It is
sufficient to show that vn(x) − tn(x) = vn′(x) − tn′(x) for all socially optimal µ.
If µ(n) = µ(n′) for all socially optimal µ, then Dn(x) = Dn′(x) and the theorem
follows. Now suppose that there is a socially optimal µ such that µ(n) 6= µ(n′) for
some agents n, n′ with identical types.
Suppose that xn = xn′ , µ
∗
x(n) = b, and µ
∗
x(n
′) = b′. Without loss of generality,








































2If b′ > b + 1, then there must be some other agent n′′ whose quality xn′′ = xn = xn′ and
µ∗x(n
′′) = b+ 1. Transitively, it is sufficient to consider n′′ and n.
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Since µ∗x−n,0(n














































A.2 Appendix to Chapter 3
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that H1 wins the period 0 contract. Given
s10 and s20, the lifetime expected payoff of honoring the period 0 contract is






Pr(s2k ≥ t1k)E[U(s1k, s2k) + U(s2k, s1k)|s2k ≥ t1k]
+ Pr(t1k ≥ s2k)E[U(s1k, t1k)|t1k ≥ s2k]
}
Given s10 and s20, the lifetime expected payoff of reneging on the period 0 contract
is






Pr(s1k ≥ t2k)E[U(s1k, t1k)|s1k ≥ t2k]
}
67
The strategies form a distribution independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium if for
all realizations of s10 and s20






Pr(s2k ≥ t1k)E[U(s1k, s2k) + U(s2k, s1k)|s2k ≥ t1k]
+ Pr(t1k ≥ s2k)E[U(s1k, t1k)|t1k ≥ s2k]
}






Pr(s1k ≥ t2k)E[U(s1k, t1k)|s1k ≥ t2k]
}
Since student types are independently and identically distributed this inequality
simplifies to:
F (s20)








E[U(s1k, s2k) + U(s2k, s1k)|s2k ≥ t1k] +
5
6
E[U(s1k, t1k)|t1k ≥ s2k]
}








E[U(s1k, t1k)|s1k ≥ t2k]
}
Let
A(s10, s20) = F (s20)






E[U(s1k, t1k)|s1k ≥ t2k]
Note that B is a constant, and E[A(s1k, s2k)] > B. Therefore
δ
1− δ
≥ A(s20, s10)− A(s10, s20)
E[A(s1k, s2k)]−B
The assumptions about the existence of all moments of interest and the boundedness
of U(·, ·) imply that
0 ≤ sup
{
A(s20, s10)− A(s10, s20)
E[A(s1k, s2k)]−B




A(s20, s10)− A(s10, s20)
E[A(s1k, s2k)]−B
∣∣∣∣ (s10, s20) ∈ [0, a]× [0, a] and s10 ≥ s20}
The critical δ such that the strategies form a distribution independent perfect




It is clear that H1 cannot profitably deviate by reneging and the reporting
ŝ1n > s2n since doing so is never better than reneging and reporting ŝ1n ≤ s2n.
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Using a weak dominance argument, I now show that H1 cannot profitably deviate
by reneging on the contract and then reporting ŝ1n ≤ s2n in any period. Suppose
that in period n, H1 reneges and reports ŝ1n = s2n.
3 If H2’s good student wins the
period n Vickrey auction, then H1 is worse off for her deviation, since it receives
U(s2n, t1n) in period n; H1’s payoff in subsequent periods is unchanged since C does
not learn that H1 reneged in period n. If H1 wins the period n Vickrey auction, then
H1 receives U(s1n, s2n)+U(s2n, s1n) in period n. Since s2n is a winning report in the
period n Vickrey auction, H1’s period n payoff is the same regardless of whether
it reneges and reports ŝ1n = s2n or it follows the strategy specified in the theorem.
However, since s2n was a winning report in the period n Vickrey auction, C learns
that H1 reneged in period n and therefore sets qn+1 = 0, making H1 strictly worse
off in period n+ 1 and no better off in periods n+ 2, n+ 3, · · · .
A.3 Appendix to Chapter 4
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3.1
This proof appears as a series of lemmas. The first uses the gross substitutes
condition to establish an inequality concerning the marginal product of an arbitrary
worker. The next four lemmas construct an s∗ such that (F ∗, µ∗, s∗) is individually
rational. Then, a final lemma shows that an individually rational allocation must
be in the core.
Lemma A.3.1. Let j be any agent in Ω and let A be any subset of Ω containing j.
3Conditional on reneging, the report ŝ1n = s2n weakly dominates any report ŝ1n < s2n.
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Then for any A
′ ⊆ A such that j ∈ A′ and any k ∈ A′
yj(A)− yj(A\{k}) ≤ yj(A′)− yj(A′\{k})
Proof. Define s = {s1j, · · · , sj−1j, sj+1j, · · · , snj} by sij = σij if i ∈ A\{k}, skj =





































ij = sij if i ∈ A
′
and sij = ∞



























)− yj(A′\{k}) ≥ s′kj = yj(A)− yj(A\{k})
Lemma A.3.2. Suppose that (F ∗, µ∗) is socially optimal. Then there exists sj =







Proof. The proof constructs an appropriate sj. Define sj = {s1j, s2j, · · · , snj} as
follows.
1. If i 6∈ µ∗(j), let sij = maxA⊆Ω{yj(A ∪ {i})− yj(A), aiµ∗−1(i) + siµ∗−1(i) − aij}






































is not empty. By Lemma A.3.1,
min
A⊆µ∗(j)
yj(A)− yj(A\{i}) = yj(µ∗(j))− yj(µ∗(j)\{i})
By Equation 4.2
σij ≤ yj(µ∗(j))− yj(µ∗(j)\{i})
Since (F ∗, µ∗) is socially optimal, for all j
′ ∈ F ∗\{j}
aij + y



















Therefore, the interval is not empty and the constructed sj exists.
Now show that µ∗(j) ∈ argmaxC⊆Ω yj(C) −
∑
i∈C\{j} sij. By construction of
sj, any element of argmaxC⊆Ω y
j(C)−
∑
i∈C\{j} sij is a subset of µ
∗(j). Let A denote
any proper subset of µ∗(j). Then for any k ∈ µ∗(j)\A
yj(A ∪ {k})− yj(A) ≥ skj
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Thus






Iterating this process, µ∗(j) ∈ argmaxC⊆Ω yj(C)−
∑
i∈C\{j} sij.
To construct s∗ from the sj, let s∗i = sij whenever i ∈ µ∗(j). Now show that
(F ∗, µ∗, s∗) is individually rational.
Lemma A.3.3. Suppose that (F ∗, µ∗) is socially optimal. At s∗, it is not rational
for any i ∈ µ∗(j) to quit.
Proof. By construction, s∗i ≥ σij. Therefore
aij + s
∗
i ≥ aij + σij = aii + yi({i})
which is exactly the condition that it is not rational for i to quit.
Lemma A.3.4. Suppose that (F ∗, µ∗) is socially optimal. At s∗, it is not rational
for j to fire any set of employees C ⊆ µ∗(j)\{j}.
Proof. Let C be any subset of µ∗(j)\{j}. Denote the agents in C by i1, i2, · · · , i|C|.
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Then
yj(µ∗(j))− yj(µ∗(j)\C) = yj(µ∗(j))− yj(µ∗(j)\{i1})
+ yj(µ∗(j)\{i1})− yj(µ∗(j)\{i1, i2})
+ · · ·
+ yj(µ∗(j)\{i1, · · · , im−1})− yj(µ∗(j)\{i1, · · · , i|C|})





which is exactly the condition that it is not rational for j to fire any subset of its
employees.
Lemma A.3.5. Suppose that (F ∗, µ∗) is socially optimal and (F ∗, µ∗, s∗) is an in-
dividually rational allocation. Then (F ∗, µ∗, s∗) is in the core.
Proof. Suppose that (F ∗, µ∗, s∗) is not in the core, i.e. there exists A ⊆ Ω, f ∈ A,
and salaries sif for all i ∈ A such that sff = yf (A)−
∑
i∈A\{f} sif and
aif + sif ≥ aiµ∗−1(i) + s∗i












Let F = {j ∈ F ∗\A|µ∗(j)\{j}∩A 6= ∅} and let W = {i ∈ W ∗\A|µ∗−1(i) ∈ A}.
These sets respectively represent the set of firms not in A who lose one or more
employees to A and the set of workers not in A who lose their employer to A.
Therefore, the set A ∪ F ∪W is the set of all agents whose welfare is affected when
A breaks away. Since (F ∗, µ∗) is socially optimal, the total welfare received by agents
in A∪F ∪W under (F ∗, µ∗) must equal or exceed the total welfare received by those













































































i.e. A is not a blocking coalition.
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